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Abstract:  
 
Art XX GATT, listing the policy grounds available to WTO Members that wish to deviate from 
their GATT obligations, makes some of them conditional on a requirement of necessity in relation to 
the pursued interest. In their reports, Panels and the AB have developed the analysis of this element in 
two separate but interlaced tests: one whereby they allegedly perform an exercise of ‘weighing and 
balancing’ of the interests involved (a value-judgment), the other ascertaining the trade-
restrictiveness of the measures challenged (an optimization analysis). It is submitted that an appraisal 
of the case-law demonstrates that this distinction is artificial, and most importantly, that no real 
balancing is ever performed - or in any event, relied on - to determine the outcome of a dispute (Claim 
1). However, a diffuse trend of ‘strict proportionality’ is discernible in the case-law, not so much 
within the ‘weigh and balance’ analysis, but within the trade-restrictiveness test. The latter, therefore, 
is arguably less value-neutral than the quasi-judicial bodies would claim it to be, and then WTO 
Members tend to understand, when construing the necessity requirement (Claim 2). 
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1. INTRO 
 
Art XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entitles Members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures, provided that 
they fall into one of the categories listed therein, each related to a different policy objective, 
and they are applied in a non-discriminatory way. In particular, exceptions designed to 
promote public morals, human (and animal and plant) health, and compliance with GATT-
consistent national norms must be ‘necessary’ to achieve the sought objective. This article is 
concerned with the interpretation and application of this necessity factor by WTO quasi-
judicial bodies (Panels and Appellate Body). 
 
The necessity test is but one of the typical devices used to govern the interplay of 
overlapping regulatory regimes in a situation of legal pluralism. Not unlike other doctrines, 
such as subsidiarity, margin of appreciation, comity, Solange etc, it aims to limit the scope 
and application of a regime that would normally enjoy priority over norms of other 
concurring regimes. The purpose of the said doctrines is to provide the ‘yielding’ norms 
with enough margin to operate, if certain conditions are/are not met, or if some subject-
matters are/are not touched upon.1 
 
An analysis of the interpretation and application of the necessity test, therefore, provides an 
optimal vantage point to take stock of the WTO’s impact on the regulatory autonomy of 
Member States and, accordingly, on the judicial review of national policies performed by the 
(quasi)judicial branch of a specific international legal regime. As such, the findings of this 
article can be easily compared with the analogue operation performed by other courts or 
tribunals (amongst others, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court 
of Human Rights, investment tribunals). 
 
The rationale of these techniques is closely related to the general regulatory design of the 
supra-national institution concerned: organizations whose purpose is the creation of 
common standards for, or the regulatory harmonization of, national regimes in certain areas 
are naturally inclined to discourage regulatory diversity and fragmentation (and to allow for 
State discretion only subject to certain conditions).2 On the other hand, other organizations 
tend to acknowledge ample freedom in relation to domestic policies (the means): the focus is 
rather on the attainment of the agreed objectives (the ends), and regulatory diversity is the 
default standard (‘laissez-régler’). The WTO system, in particular, is precisely premised on 
the principle of de-regulation, or of negative integration.3 States retain their sovereign 
power to choose and implement their regulatory policies as they deem fit, as long as they do 
not interfere with the international commitments under the WTO.4  
                                                 
1 For an insightful account of these doctrines as the normal toolkit to perform ‘constitutional interpretation 
and adjudication’ see, for instance, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘De-Fragmentation of International Economic 
Law Through Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication with Due Respect for Reasonable Disagreement’ 
(2008) 6 Loyola U Chicago Intl L Rev 209-248. See also Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Rethinking Constitutional 
Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism’ (2008) 6 Intl J Con L 415-456. 
2 The European Union is one example in many fields of regulation, although it is suggested that the 
enlargement of its membership and competences might cause a shift from a model of positive integration to 
one of negative integration, see Giandomenico Majone, ‘Liberalization, Re-Regulation, and Mutual 
Recognition: Lessons from Three Decades of EU Experience’ (2009) Scottish Jean Monnet Centre Working 
Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 1, <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_111516_en.pdf>. 
3 Among the multiple works expounding this premise, Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Market Access in the GATT’ 
(2008) STALS Research Paper 7/2008 <http://www.stals.sssup.it/site/files/stals_Mavroidis.pdf> stands out 
for clarity. See also Joel P Trachtman, ‘The Constitutions of the WTO’ (2006) 17 EJIL 623-646. 
4 The classic view is encapsulated in the following passage in Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Law and Politics in the 
WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship’, in Jochen A Frowein and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), 
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In this article, the WTO reports on the necessity test will be analyzed, to ascertain whether 
States preserve a considerable regulatory margin of manoeuvre in the WTO system, and 
whether such margin has a predictable scope. A negative answer to either of these questions 
would suggest that the spirit of negative integration has given way, at least in part, to 
normative harmonization and centralized cost-benefit assessment. To put it bluntly, the de-
regulatory inspiration of the GATT 1947 is maybe under the wearisome attack of the 
necessity test, as performed by the Panels and the AB. Could it be that necessity has, to 
some extent, killed the GATT? 
 
2. THE NECESSITY TEST IN ART XX GATT 
 
The necessity test, as it stands now, is briefly but comprehensively enounced in the 
following recital of the report of the Appellate Body (AB) in the Brazil Tyres case: 
 
In order to determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ within the meaning of art XX(b) of 
the GATT 1994, a panel must assess all the relevant factors, particularly the extent of the 
contribution to the achievement of a measure’s objective and its trade restrictiveness, in the 
light of the importance of the interests or values at stake. If this analysis yields a preliminary 
conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing the 
measure with its possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while providing an 
equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued. It rests upon the 
complaining Member to identify possible alternatives to the measure at issue that the 
responding Member could have taken. … [I]n order to qualify as an alternative, a measure 
proposed by the complaining Member must be not only less trade restrictive than the 
measure at issue, but should also ‘preserve for the responding Member its right to achieve 
its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued’. … If the responding 
Member demonstrates that the measure proposed by the complaining Member is not a 
genuine alternative or is not ‘reasonably available’, taking into account the interests or 
values being pursued and the responding Member's desired level of protection, it follows 
that the measure at issue is necessary.5 
 
It is possible to break this composite test down into single elements, each amenable to either 
of the two sub-tests which can be referred to, respectively, using the ‘weighing and 
balancing’ (WAB) formula6 and the LTRM acronym (which stands for Least Trade-
Restrictive Means). From the passage above, it transpires that both these tests aim to assess 
whether a certain measure is indeed necessary, the difference being that whereas the WAB 
test yields a ‘preliminary’ conclusion, the ‘confirmation’ comes from the LTRM test. 
 
Briefly, the necessity test routine comprises the following steps: 
 
Weighing and Balancing (WAB) 
I. Assessment of the importance of the value at stake (the Value); 
                                                                                                                                                        
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 5/2001 (2001) 609, 657: ‘The [European Court of Justice]’s 
jurisprudence is based on the premise that legislative correction is possible at the supranational level. That 
possibility does not obtain within the WTO’. 
5 WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres—Report of the Appellate Body (17 December 2007) 
WT/DS332/AB/R [156]. 
6 Which was first stated in WTO, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef—Report of 
the Appellate Body (11 December 2000) WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, at [164]. The AB referred to 
the process ‘of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by 
the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation 
on imports or exports.’ More on this below. 
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II. Assessment of the contribution that the challenged measure makes to the 
 Value; 
III. Assessment of the trade-restrictiveness of the measure. 
 
Least-Trade Restrictive Means (LTRM) test 
  
 I. Ascertainment of the correspondence between the Value and one of the  prongs of 
 Art. XX GATT;  
II. Annotation of the level of protection of the Value sought by the respondent; 
 III. Ascertainment that no alternative measure can achieve the same level of 
 protection,  while being less trade-restrictive; 
 IV. Ascertainment that alternative measures identified under 3) are reasonably 
 available. 
 
A first claim of this article is that the WAB-half – at least in the way it has operated so far 
before the Panels and the AB – brings no added value to the LTRM-half, other than serving 
as a gateway filter for unacceptable measures. However, this does not mean that the 
necessity test is reduced to a mechanical analysis, because some discretion-laden pattern is 
indeed discernible in the use that Panels and AB make of the LTRM test. The second claim, 
it follows, is that an element of stricto sensu proportionality (or cost-benefit analysis) guides 
at times the necessity test performed by Panels and AB, but this exercise of appreciation is 
not embedded in the balancing effort (as it would be normal to assume), but in the loose 
application of the LTRM analysis (which would, in principle, bar discretionary evaluation). 
 
This article takes stock of the WTO’s grands arrêts on necessity, by tracing the development 
of the test in a rigorous chronological perspective. This analysis permits to appreciate how 
the test was repeatedly integrated and adjusted over time, and reveals the process that led 
to the over-elaborated version described above. Such a retrospective will lead to the 
conclusion that, in essence, some elements of the necessity test as it stands now are less an 
essential part thereof than a residue of accumulation, and could be interpreted away without 
being too concerned with their distinct effet utile. 
 
The interpretation and application of art XX GATT, and the necessity test in particular, 
have attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention;7 however, the following overview 
focuses on some original elements that have been generally disregarded in the literature. 
Namely, this article intends to substantiate the claim that the WAB-test is irrelevant and 
that the case-law reveals an unavowed pattern of judicial interference into States’ policies. 
 
3. NECESSITY IN THE GATT-DAYS: ENTER THE LTRM  
 
                                                 
7 Among the most recent and complete works, see Glyn Ayres and Andrew D. Mitchell, ‘General and Security 
Exceptions under the GATT and GATS’ in Indira Carr, Jahid Bhuiyan and Shawkat Alam (eds), International 
Trade Law and WTO (Federation Press 2012); Gisele Kapterian, ‘A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on 
'Necessity’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 89; Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia J Trans L 73; Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: 
WTO Law: in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 42 Texas Intl L J 371; Donald H. Regan, ‘The meaning of 
‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: the myth of cost–benefit balancing’ (2007) 6 WTR 
347. For a detailed analysis of the single disputes relevant to the definition and application of this test see also 
Filippo Fontanelli, ‘Whose Margin Is It? State Discretion and Judges’ Appreciation in the Necessity 
Quicksand’ in Filippo Fontanelli, Giuseppe Martinico and Paolo Carrozza (eds), Shaping Rule of Law Through 
Dialogue. International and Supranational Experiences (European Law Publishing 2009) 377. For an earlier 
article that served as a stepping stone for the 2009 article and the present one, see Alan O. Sykes, ‘The Least 
Restrictive Means’ (2003) 70 U Chicago L Rev 403. 
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As anticipated, the word ‘necessary’ in art XX(a) (b) and (d) GATT gradually unfolded into 
a complex legal test. It is noteworthy that, in the words of Schoenbaum, this provision led 
to a semantic shift, since in the test currently in use ‘necessary no longer relates to the 
protection of living things, but to whether or not the measure is a ‘necessary’ departure 
from the trade agreement.’8 Hence, the idea that all deviations from the trade obligations 
should be minimized is at the basis of the LTRM paradigm.  
 
The LTRM principle was first used in 1990 by the GATT Panel US – Section 337,9 which 
seemingly took cues from the EC’s suggestion to the Panel,10 an all the more reasonable 
hypothesis since Pierre Pescatore (former judge at the European Court of Justice and 
passionate advocate of the process of European integration) was sitting on the Panel. At 
that (pre-WTO) time, the LTRM analysis was the only selection device used to check the 
GATT-compliance of measures allegedly falling under one of the prongs of art XX(a), (b) 
and (d) GATT (besides the application of the chapeau), and other Panels adopted it after its 
first appearance.11 
 
However, this early version of the LTRM test was still relatively under-developed. For 
instance, Panels tended to accept alternative less-restrictive measures without careful 
consideration of the level of protection set by the respondents; neither did they spend 
particular efforts to make sure that the alternative measure was reasonably available to 
them.12 Nevertheless, in the early 90s Panels became familiar with the idea that GATT-
inconsistency could be measured and arranged on a scale of gravity, and it was possible to 
identify the measure that was less GATT-inconsistent than the others.13 
 
The LTRM test, on its face, is a formula of (Pareto) efficiency,14 and it did not take long for 
Contracting Parties to wonder why efficiency had become a standard of review in a regime 
                                                 
8 Thomas J Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation’ (1997) 91 AJIL 269, 276, mentioned in Kapterian (n 7) 103. 
9 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1990) GATT BISD 36S/345, 392-93 [5.26]: ‘[A] 
contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as ‘necessary’ ... if an 
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other 
GATT provisions is available to it’. 
10 According to Stone Sweet and Mathews (n 7) 156, the EC put forward this test bearing in mind the doctrine 
of proportionality in use in EU and ECHR law. The US, on its part, had proposed a stricter test based on 
rational analysis of the measure (the so-called ‘strict in theory, fatal in fact’ strict scrutiny test). Seemingly, 
‘each side was proceeding on the basis of their understanding of how Least Restrictive Means tests are used in 
their own systems’. 
11 Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (1991) GATT BISD 37S/200, 223 
[74-75] (inconsistencies with GATT obligations arising from a national measure were deemed to be 
legitimate only as far as they were ‘unavoidable’; the word ‘necessary’ has the same meaning in art XX(b) and 
(d)); United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) GATT BISD 39S/155 (unadopted); United States – 
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (1992) GATT BISD 39S/206 [5.52]. 
12 On this, see Kapterian (n 7) 103, and the literature referred to therein, in particular Deborah A Osiro, 
‘GATT/WTO Necessity Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretation and Its Impact on the Autonomy of Domestic 
Regulation’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 123, 127-128. 
13 Kapterian (n 7) 105, holds that not only is this assessment difficult to make, due to the absence of a shared 
view on how to measure GATT-inconsistency, but also it does not seem to be allowed by art XX GATT, 
because the meaning of the word ‘exception’ ‘does not provide space for shading.’ However, this argument 
does not appear compelling: the LTRM test is an interpretative elaboration of the word ‘necessity,’ therefore, 
it does not relate to the (indeed monolithic) exceptional nature of the measure, but to the conditions precedent 
for it to arise, which might well be dependent on a value judgment. 
14 By this we mean that, since it keeps one of the variable fixed (achievement of the regulatory purpose), it is 
not a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis, of the kind used to maximize global welfare, but a truncated version 
thereof. On this, see Chad P Bown and Joel P Trachtman, ‘Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres: A Balancing Act’ (2009) 8 WTR 85. 
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that, purportedly, should eminently care about non-discrimination and negative integration, 
rather than regulatory positive harmonization. Moreover, the strict LTRM test 
understandably disconcerted the WTO Members, as it seemed to ‘require dispute 
settlement panels to dictate the specific measure to be adopted by a WTO Member, since 
presumably there was only one measure among all the alternatives that was the ‘least 
inconsistent’ with the GATT 1994.’15 
 
When the US acted as responding party in the US – Shrimps dispute, it fought at length 
with the received interpretation of necessity deriving from the US – Section 337 report, 
notably protesting that the intricate LTRM test and the steps that it required could not be 
inferred from the normal meaning of the art XX(b) provision in light of the standards of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
 
The use of one word, ‘necessary’, was a slender reed indeed on which to hang such an 
extensive and complex set of obligations. Rather than attempt to impose a reading of the 
text that no reader could be expected to know, it would be wiser to interpret the language in 
accordance with its normal meaning.16 
 
The backlash against the LTRM test was not simply an element of the US’ defensive 
strategy, but more generally an instance of the Parties’ distrust of the Panels’ and AB’s 
activism.17 According to the US, the chapeau of art XX (mandating that domestic measures 
be applied non-discriminatorily and non-arbitrarily, and not disguise a trade restriction) 
would have been sufficient to ensure that protectionist measures could not stand scrutiny, 
and the LTRM test was, in short, uncalled-for and intrusive. 
 
For a while, certain States simply could not come to terms with the LTRM test, as 
illustrated by Argentina’s vehement complaint18: 
 
Where does subparagraph (d) prescribe that the government of a State must analyze an 
array of options, and choose the least restrictive? What is the yardstick for defining what is 
less restrictive? Accepting this approach would mean supplanting the sovereignty of 
governments by a panel’s evaluation. … A certain degree of discretion must therefore be 
allowed to the member invoking the exception in determining which measure is necessary 
for securing observance of laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the general 
agreement. 
 
4. THE ABSOLUTE FREEDOM TO SET THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION 
 
In the first case of the WTO era, US – Gasoline,19 the Panel applied art XX(b) GATT, and 
significantly expanded the necessity test used hitherto.20 Firstly, it took cognizance of the 
different words that the Contracting Parties used in art XX GATT to indicate the link 
                                                 
15 WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of the Panel (15 May 
1998) WT/DS58 [3.228] summarizing the position of the US. 
16 ibid [3.225]. 
17 ibid [3.226]: ‘After all,’ the US stated ‘the basic thrust of the GATT was to prevent protectionism, not to 
intrude on the decision making of the contracting parties when pursuing legitimate policy objectives such as 
environmental protection’. 
18 WTO, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather—Report of 
the Panel (19 December 2000) WT/DS155 [8.251-252]. 
19 WTO, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline—Report of the Panel (29 January 
1996) WT/DS2, WT/DS4. 
20 For the record, the US invoked the art XX(g) GATT defense as well (relating to the protection of limited 
natural resources), but the AB found that the measure under review was applied in a discriminatory way, and 
therefore breached the chapeau of art XX GATT. 
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between the measure and the various values pursued, stating that a different meaning must 
be attached to each formulation. In particular, the ‘necessity’ word (letters a, b and d) 
postulated a closer connection between the measure and the policy objective than that 
required by the ‘related to’ formula (letters c, g and e). 
 
The Panel set up a three-tiered test to perform the judicial review under art XX(b) GATT, 
requesting the responding party to establish 
 
(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision was invoked fell within 
the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (2) that the 
inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were necessary to fulfill 
the policy objective; and (3) that the measures were applied in conformity with the 
requirements of the introductory clause of Article XX.21  
 
The Panel ran the LTRM test and even suggested an alternative measure, less restrictive 
than (and as effective as22) the US one. In so doing, the Panel took upon itself the burden of 
proof regarding the research of the alternative, and seemingly deviated from the general 
principle that the party who wants to invoke an exception must prove that preconditions for 
its application are met.23 
More importantly, the newly established Appellate Body clarified that the subject of the 
judicial review of national regulatory measures is the measures themselves, not the value 
that they pursue (the Value) and the expected level of attainment thereof.24 As Mavroidis 
lucidly puts it, ‘a WTO adjudicating body […] can extend its judicial review only with respect to 
the means used to achieve the ends: ends are not justiciable, means are.’25 
 
The US – Gasoline dispute, ultimately, established the untouchable nature of the level of 
protection set unilaterally by the State (let alone the choice of the value to protect),26 
                                                 
21 See ibid [6.20]. 
22 Ibid [6.22-29]. In particular, [6.27]: ‘slightly stricter overall requirements applied to both domestic and 
imported gasoline could offset any possibility of an adverse environmental effect from these causes, and allow 
the United States to achieve its desired level of clean air without discriminating against imported gasoline. 
Such requirements could be implemented by the United States at any time’. According to Kapterian (n 7) 103, 
the test was applied somehow loosely, since the Panel was content with an alternative capable to achieve one 
of the objectives of the measure ‘often,’ but presumably not always, as sought after by US. On this loose 
version of the LTRM (where the alternative is less trade-restrictive, but also slightly less effective than the 
one quashed), see Donald H Regan, ‘Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade within a Federal or 
Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo’ (2001) 99 Mich L Rev 1853, 1899–1900. 
23 Moreover, the AB snubbed US’ attempt to use the costliness of the alternative measure as a proof of its non-
availability, by using art 27 of the Vienna Convention, see WTO, US – Gasoline—Report of the Appellate Body 
(29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, 27: ‘The fact that the United States Congress might have intervened, as it 
did later intervene, in the process by denying funding, is beside the point: the United States, of course, carries 
responsibility for actions of both the executive and legislative departments of government’. 
24 See [7.1]: ‘It was not [the Panel’s] task to examine generally the desirability or necessity of the 
environmental objectives of the Clean Air Act or the Gasoline Rule. … Under the General Agreement, WTO 
Members were free to set their own environmental objectives, but they were bound to implement these 
objectives through measures consistent with its provisions, notably those on the relative treatment of domestic 
and imported products’.   
25 Petros C Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary (OUP 2005), 191. See also the 
similar dictum in WTO, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals—Report of the Panel (14 March 1997) 
WT/DS31/R [5.9]: ‘we are neither examining nor passing judgment on the policy objectives of the Canadian 
measure regarding periodicals; we are nevertheless called upon to examine the instruments chosen by the 
Canadian Government for the attainment of such policy objectives’. 
26 See Report of the Panel (n 19), [6.22]: ‘it was not the necessity of the policy goal that was to be examined, 
but whether or not it was necessary [to adopt the challenged measures]. It was the task of the Panel to 
address whether these inconsistent measures were necessary to achieve the policy goal under Article XX(b). It 
was therefore not the task of the Panel to examine the necessity of the environmental objectives of the 
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although this alleged autonomy has come under scrutiny over time, and it is now 
controversial whether States are actually free to choose their preferred level of protection.27  
 
5. THE ADDITIONAL CHALLENGE OF ART XX(D) GATT 
 
Shortly after that, the Panel in Canada – Periodicals rejected Canada’s invocation of art 
XX(d) GATT. The Canadian measure fell even before making it to the necessity test, 
because Canada failed to prove that it ‘secured compliance’ with the designated law.28 This 
outcome suggested that, although ‘ends’ are safe from judicial review (see above), it is not 
guaranteed that all measures will get undisturbed to the necessity stage, especially if they 
are allegedly covered by art XX(d) GATT (as opposed to letter (a) and (b)). 
 
Indeed, measures falling under art XX(d) GATT pursue a Value (compliance with a 
national law, ie enforcement of its obligations) that is not an abstract one like ‘public morals’ 
or ‘human health,’ hence a judicial body can reasonably assess whether the trade-restrictive 
measure is prima facie instrumental to the enforcement of the national norm invoked, even 
before getting to the LTRM phase, where that contribution is examined and measured. 
Incidentally, neither of these tests implies any review of the aim of the national laws itself or 
of the policy the latter are designed to promote. In other words, Panels must initially verify 
whether the domestic measures do actually ‘secure compliance’ with a wider discipline, 
simply assessing prima facie the existence of a means-ends relationship between the two. 
Afterward, the LTRM test examines the efficiency of the measures with respect to the 
national policy (as opposed to the general aim it pursues, such as fighting evasion, or 
securing efficient border control). These two steps are not concerned with questioning the 
appropriateness of the Value pursued, and are based on seemingly technical evaluations.29  
 
An application of the XX (d)-specific preliminary test is visible in the Mexico – Soft Drinks 
case, where the Panel and the AB did not get as far as examining whether the challenged 
measures were ‘necessary’ under art XX(d) GATT, since the latter did not ‘secure 
compliance with [the relevant national] laws and regulations,’ and therefore fell outside the 
scope of the exception. To appreciate how the same preliminary analysis does not apply to 
exceptions other than the XX(d) ones, suffice it to recall the Panel’s Report of the EC – 
Tariff Preferences case. In that case, the Panel found that the challenged measure did not fall 
under the health heading, since it was ‘not one designed for the purpose of protecting 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gasoline Rule, or of parts of the Rule that the Panel did not specifically find to be inconsistent with the 
General Agreement.’ On the absolute freedoms of Members to set their appropriate level of protection, see 
WTO, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon—Report of the Appellate Body (6 November 1998) 
WT/DS18/AB/R [199]. 
27 Michael Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or 
Reality?’ (2010) 13 JIEL 1077-1102. 
28 See Canada – Periodicals, Report of the Panel (n 25) [3.5]: ‘The general objective of these measures is to help 
the Canadian periodical industry raise advertising revenues. Tariff Code 9958 ensures the achievement of this 
goal, with Section 19 of the Income Tax Act’. The Panel reaches its conclusion (see [5.10]) through the test 
set by a GATT Panel, whereby the ‘to secure compliance’ formula means ‘to enforce obligations under laws 
and obligations,’ not ‘to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the laws and regulations’ (see Report of the 
Panel in EC – Regulations on Imports of Parts and Components (1990) GATT BISD 37S/132 [5.14-5.18]). 
29 Contrarily, when it comes to measures allegedly covered by the art XX(b) GATT exception, not only is the 
LTRM test virtually always granted, but it must also be performed solely as regards to the ‘abstract’ value 
(health promotion), irrespectively of whether the measures are necessary to enforce any wider national 
regulation scheme. It goes without saying that in such cases it is easier for the responding Party to argue that 
the measure brings at least some contribution to the (even prospective) attainment of the public interest 
pursued. 
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human life or health’.
30 Nevertheless, the panellists, rather than stopping the review, went 
on–arguendo–to demonstrate that the necessity test and the chapeau requirements were not 
met. 
 
Intuitively, as seen above, the different approach is due to the different degree of confidence 
that Panels have when dealing with the review of measures allegedly covered by art XX(b) 
or XX(d) GATT. Even before entering the necessity test, the Panel can refuse to apply the 
art XX(d) GATT justification just by focusing on the ‘securing compliance’ parameter, and 
without questioning the legitimacy of the domestic policy indicated by the State. To sum up, 
the preliminary test applicable under art XX(d) GATT (‘is the measure prima facie capable 
of securing compliance with the national law?’) adds a layer to the review, but does not 
threaten the neutrality of the analysis with respect to the Value. On the contrary, it takes 
some temerity for a Panel to state that a measure does not fall under the category of art 
XX(b) GATT and, as a consequence, does not even deserve to reach the necessity test. Such 
a finding implies an appraisal of the declared Value and a prima facie understanding of the 
measure’s contribution to it. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Panel in EC – Tariff 
Preferences31 was self-conscious about its preliminary finding, and preferred to render it 
more solid showing that the measure would have been struck nevertheless, even if its initial 
decision on the non-subsumption under art XX(b) GATT were ultimately wrong.32 
 
Another notable example in this respect is Colombia – Entry Ports, in which Colombia tried 
to defend some border measures invoking art XX(d) GATT, namely compliance with 
national regulations aimed at the prevention of under-pricing techniques and smuggling. 
The Panel, relying on statistical data, concluded that the measures were virtually unable to 
reduce smuggling. Therefore, they were not necessary, for they did not contribute to the 
enforcement of the relevant national policy.33  
 
6. ENTER THE WAB 
 
In this well-known dispute, the claimants held that Korea’s measures requiring that 
imported beef be sold only in specialized imported beef stores, as well as Korean laws and 
regulations restricting the resale and distribution of imported beef, resulted in a violation of 
art III.4 GATT (national treatment). Korea objected, inter alia, that these measures were 
necessary to comply with its Unfair Competition Act (a domestic regulation providing for 
consumers’ protection), for the purpose of preventing retailers from deceiving consumers by 
selling imported beef as domestic beef. In the course of this controversy, the necessity test 
underwent a momentous mutation, possibly due to Korea’s incisive defence, which sought to 
hamper the Panel’s review of necessity, invoking the mantra of regulatory autonomy (and 
sending out the veiled threat that activism accusations could follow): 
                                                 
30 See WTO, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries—
Report of the Panel (1 December 2003) WT/DS246/R [7.210]. 
31 The same holds true with respect to the China – Raw Materials case, see below. 
32 This difference is efficiently encapsulated in Panama’s remark in the WTO, Colombia – Indicative Prices and 
Restrictions on Ports of Entry—Report of the Panel (27 April 2009) WT/DS366/R [7.495]: ‘whereas the Art. 
XX(b) exception is purpose-oriented, the Art. XX(d) exception is «functional»’. 
33 ibid [7.588]. In WTO, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (6 
April 2004) WT/DS276/R, the Panel was dismissive of the possibility to justify the challenged measure under 
art XX(d) GATT, see [4.371-374]. It was enough for the Panel to note that Canada had not proven that the 
grain segregation measures it adopted contributed to the enforcement of the national policies on competition 
and on fair commercialization of grain. The half-hearted invocation of art XX(d) GATT was sweepingly 
rejected by the AB (in WTO, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from The Philippines—Report 
of the Appellate Body (17 June 2011) WT/DS371/AB/R, [175-180]), for Thailand’s failure to make a prima facie 
defense and demonstrate that the measures were necessary under the general exception.  
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Korea noted that so far GATT/WTO case law has not explored the link between regulatory 
diversity, on the one hand, and the necessity requirement, on the other. Korea submitted 
that there is a correlation between the two in the sense that were a regulatory objective to 
be sought in a very strict manner, the choice of instruments would consequently be 
influenced. Since the level of protection sought cannot be put into question, the choice of 
instrument will have to be appreciated in the same context.34 
 
The Panel rejected Korea’s defence and quashed the challenged measures, pointing at less 
restrictive alternatives,35 and to an inconsistency of Korea’s policies.36 These findings were 
subsequently upheld on appeal. 
The AB (unlike the Argentina – Hides and Leather Panel) took upon itself the task of 
expounding the meaning of the term ‘necessity’ and to draw the limits of the LTRM test. It 
clarified that art XX GATT did not cover only ‘indispensable’ measures (which are 
‘certainly’ allowed protection37), but also measures bearing a slightly less direct link with 
the Value, provided that they are not just ‘making a contribution’ thereto.38 
 
More importantly, the AB’s reasoning on the necessity of measures that are not 
‘indispensable’ encouraged Panels and AB to embark on the review of the Values at stake, 
opening the floodgates to the WAB test and to cost-benefit analysis. Firstly, the AB hinted 
at a graduation of importance of the Values, suggesting that ‘the more vital’ the value, the 
easier it would be for the measure to prove ‘necessary.’39 
 
It is remarkable to learn from the AB, keeping in mind the Section 337 paradigm, that the 
outcome of the necessity test is not solely a matter of efficiency, but also depends on a value-
judgment (that is, how important the pursued Value is). This was but the first crack in the 
LTRM building. The AB went on to add other elements that should provide guidance in the 
‘process of weighing and balancing a series of factors,’ an exercise that implies, on its face, a 
                                                 
34 WTO, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef—Report of the Panel (31 July 2000) 
WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R [242]. 
35 As for the LTRM test, see Report of the Panel [672]: ‘For instance, a generally applied record-keeping 
requirement backed with sanctions would constitute a WTO consistent alternative to the WTO inconsistent 
dual retail system. If foreign beef shops can keep book-records, it is difficult to see why the same could not be 
requested from domestic shops’.   
36 In fact, the AB correctly stresses the legitimacy of the reasoning by which the panel had noted the absence 
of similar measures in other market sectors. Korea had alleged that this fact could not imply that the stricter 
measures adopted for the beef sector were not necessary, as this finding would amount to an interference in 
Korea’s right to set the level of protection at its sole discretion, and to set different levels of protection in 
different market sectors. The AB stated that this comparative analysis had in fact the different purpose of 
highlighting that efficient alternative measures were available, as the one Korea used to enforce in the non-
beef sectors of the market. See Korea – Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 6) [175-178]. Benn McGrady, 
‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory 
Measures’ (2009) 12 JIEL 153, 159, notes that the panel and the AB characterized Korea’s goal in different 
ways, somewhat contrary to the principle that each State has the power to define it autonomously, and that the 
loose formulation of the goal adopted by the AB made it easier to find equally efficient alternatives. 
37 This is also a controversial statement. By putting indispensible measures in a safe haven, the AB makes it 
unlikely that the balancing is applied at all, see Regan, The Meaning (n 7) 354. 
38 Korea – Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 6), [161]. See the similar holding of the ECtHR in the 
Handyside case (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976) 5, where the 
judges observed that ‘the adjective ‘necessary,’ … is not synonymous with ‘indispensable’ [and] neither has it 
the flexibility of such expressions as … ‘admissible,’ … ‘useful,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘desirable’. 
39 Korea – Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 6), [162]. To help the adjudicator in handling such an 
indistinct test, the AB argues that it is helpful to ‘take into account the relative importance of the common 
interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or 
important those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a measure 
designed as an enforcement instrument’. 
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significant degree of discretion by the reviewer.40 Specifically, it lays down two additional 
guidelines: the greater the contribution of the measure to the enforcement of the national 
policy, and/or the lighter its trade-restrictiveness, the more easily it will pass the necessity 
test. Enter the WAB test: 
 
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may nevertheless 
be ‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of 
weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made 
by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the 
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.41 
 
This move signalled that the AB is into the business of looking into the merits of the 
measures under review (not simply into their efficiency and their functional design) and of 
embarking on a review of proportionality.42 There is an inherent contradiction between this 
balancing activity and the oft-repeated assumption that Member States have the right ‘to 
determine for themselves the level of enforcement of their WTO-consistent laws,’ that is, 
the level of protection of the Value.43 However, the AB declared that the fully fledged WAB 
test was already ‘encapsulated’ in the LTRM Section 337 test, packed within the ‘reasonable 
expectation that the contracting party employs’ alternative measures. In other words, the 
AB allegedly did nothing new, and simply unpacked the ‘reasonable’ element, so as to obtain 
the WAB test. 
 
In the EC – Asbestos case44 the WAB/LTRM compound test of Korea – Beef was applied 
again, although ultimately the French ban at bar was found to be indispensable to achieve the 
Value (a zero-risk protection against asbestos-related illness45). Accordingly the AB spared 
the ban from the WAB assessment,46 after noting that that the preservation of human life 
and health is ‘vital and important in the highest degree.’47 On this occasion, the EC’s 
invocation of a zero-risk policy proved successful, as it made the LTRM test an uphill battle 
for the claimant. Since then, many responding parties have tried to mimic this strategy 
when invoking art XX GATT, but Panels and AB have countered this strategy, by 
                                                 
40 ibid [163]. 
41 ibid [164]. 
42 See Regan, The Meaning (n 7) 355-356: ‘there is nothing in the text of Article XX(d) to suggest that 
different regulatory purposes are accorded different values by Article XX(d). A fortiori, there is nothing to 
suggest that it is appropriate for the Appellate Body to rank Members’ regulatory purposes according to the 
Appellate Body’s intuitions about their value’. See Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism - 
Reimagining the Global Economic Order (OUP 2011) 323, noting that the AB’s statement implies a strong test of 
stricto sensu proportionality, and Peter Van den Bossche, ‘Looking for Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2008) 35 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 283-294. 
43 Korea – Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 6) [176]. This contradiction is lucidly described in Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, ‘Comment on Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres’ (2009) 8 WTR 137, 141. 
See also Regan, The Meaning (n 7) 353 ff. 
44 WTO, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products—Report of the 
Appellate Body (12 March 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R. 
45 WTO, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products—Report of the 
Panel (18 September 2000) WT/DS135/R [8.217]: ‘controlled use does not constitute a reasonable alternative 
to the banning of chrysotile asbestos that might be chosen by a decision-maker responsible for developing 
public health measures, bearing in mind the objectives pursued by France [absolute halt to risk-spreading]’. 
46 In this respect, see Regan, The Meaning (n 7), and Robert Howse and Elisabeth Türk ‘The WTO Impact on 
Internal Regulations—A Case Study of the Canada–EC Asbestos Dispute’, in Graínne de Búrca and Joanne 
Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart 2002) 283, 324. 
47 See Report of the Appellate Body (n 44), [172]. 
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somehow assessing the veracity (not the appropriateness, of course) of zero-risk 
declarations.48 
 
Famously, the AB in Korea – Beef second-guessed Korea’s declared objective to eliminate ‘all 
fraud,’ noticing that such ‘unlikely’ objective would probably require a ban on all imports, 
hence Korea’s policy objective was toned down to a more modest ‘considerable reduction’ of 
fraud, an aim that could be conveniently achieved also by less-restrictive measures than 
those adopted.49 Conversely, the Panel and the AB showed more deference to Brazil’s 
declaration, in the Tyres case, that the purpose its measure intended to achieve was the 
reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumulation ‘to the maximum extent possible.’ Brazil 
arguably got away with that because it managed to convince the Panel that reduced tyre-
accumulation was the Value, whereas it actually was a means to protect health (the real 
Value). In so doing, it benefitted from an Asbestos-treatment with respect to necessity. This 
is further developed in part 8, below. 
 
7. PAYING LIP-SERVICE TO THE WAB: GAMBLING AND CIGARETTES 
 
The US – Gambling and Dominican Republic – Cigarettes cases50 added nothing to the Korea – 
Beef test (apart from the Gambling one inaugurating the case-law on a new Value, ie morals 
and public order51), but it is worthwhile to examine how the WAB test played out in these 
disputes. In the reports Korea – Beef and US – Asbestos, in spite of the large amount of 
reasoning devoted to its formulation, the balancing moment hardly contributed to the 
dispositifs (in Asbestos, the measure was indispensable, therefore no balancing was needed; in 
Korea – Beef the conclusion was reached through the LTRM analysis, even if a WAB balance 
would have been very easy to assess: since Korea had an outright ban in place, the ‘trade-
restrictiveness’ score was clearly at its maximum).52 
 
As it turned out, the WAB did not play a significant role in these two cases either. In 
Gambling, the AB found that the US measures were necessary in the abstract, but were 
applied in violation of the chapeau of art XX GATT.53 In Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, 
instead, the challenged measures54 were found to be unnecessary because they were so 
ineffective that many other GATT-consistent alternatives could be foreseen, and keeping 
                                                 
48 Since the notion of zero-risk ‘is an abstraction,’ it is understandable that the adjudicators feel entitled to 
reshape it as a ‘de minimis’ risk-tolerance, see Damien J Neven and Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Japan - Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Apples: One Bad Apple?’ in Henrik Horn and Petros C Mavroidis (eds), The WTO 
Case Law of 2003 (CUP 2006) 289–290. 
49 Korea – Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 6) [172] and [178]. 
50 WTO, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services—Report of the 
Appellate Body (7 April 2005 WT/DS285/AB/R; Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes—Report of the Appellate Body (25 April 2005) WT/DS302/AB/R. 
51 WTO, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services—Report of the 
Panel (10 November 2004) WT/DS285/R [3.279]: ‘Remote supply of gambling raises significant concerns 
relating to the maintenance of public order and the protection of public morals.’ See also [3.273-277]. Morals 
and public order are protected under art XIV(a) GATS, the avatar of art XX(a) GATT. 
52 See Regan, The Meaning (n 7) 361, referring to Asbestos, Gambling and Cigarettes: ‘when it comes to actually 
deciding the case, all three rely on the principle that Members get to choose their own level of protection.’ See 
also Caroline E Foster, ‘Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade Organisation’s Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ (2008) 11 JIEL 427, 437; Howse and Türk (n 46) 326. 
53 The Panel had held that since the US had failed to negotiate with Antigua, it could not be sure that the 
measure was actually the LTRM available. The AB overturned this part of the Panel report. 
54 Which were allegedly taken to enforce the obligations under the national Tax Code, and were useful in 
preventing cigarette smuggling, see WTO, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal 
Sale of Cigarettes – Report of the Panel (26 November 2004) WT/DS302/R [4.88].   
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the zero-tolerance level as a constant would have not been reasonable.55 The respondent 
party attempted to lure the Panel into issuing a good cost-benefit report, describing the 
high importance of the public interest pursued (compliance with tax laws) and the minimal 
impact of the measures on the imports, but even if the Panel did not challenge this 
reconstruction the measure was not spared.56 
 
Arguably, the Korea – Beef bit where the AB maintained that the balancing test is 
‘encapsulated’ in the LTRM analysis (see above) might be revealing of the real stance of 
WTO judicial bodies towards the balancing task. The reason why the WAB is never really 
used to balance values between them and to assess their proportionality is that the WAB, in 
the particular WTO scenario, is of no practical use. Of its three elements, one is virtually 
untouchable57 (the importance of the Value), and the LTRM test already takes care of the 
other two (the ‘less-restrictive but equally effective’ quality of the sought-after alternative 
postulates that efficiency and restrictiveness are already known variables, and are decisive in 
appraisal of necessity).58 
 
The classic balancing test, therefore, has little in common with a real proportionality test, 
nor does it allow for express cost-benefit analysis.59 The ‘weighing and balancing,’ all things 
considered, must be seen as a preparatory exercise, a propaedeutic to the LTRM test. It is 
possible to get a glimpse of this unconfessed approach in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, 
where the Panel, after running the WAB assessment, bridges to the LTRM as follows: 
‘having said that [referring to the WAB], the Panel will focus its analysis on whether [the 
measure] … is in fact necessary [to achieve the Value],’
60 clearly suggesting that only the 
                                                 
55 ibid [7.228]: ‘Dominican Republic has not proved why, for example, providing secure tax stamps to foreign 
exporters … would not be equivalent to the current tax stamp requirement in terms of allowing it to secure 
the same high level of enforcement with regard to tax collection and the prevention of cigarette smuggling.’ 
More boldly, the AB found ‘no evidence to conclude that the tax collection requirement secures a zero 
tolerance level of enforcement…’ (see Report of the Appellate Body (n 50) [72]). 
56 On the difficulty of understanding the rationale and the functionality of the WAB test, see Steve Charnovitz, 
‘The WTO’s Environmental Progress’ (2008) 10 JIEL 685. 
57 The fact is, in any event, that ‘in no case to date has a Panel or the Appellate Body found that a measure 
pursues values of only moderate or negligible importance.’ See Ayers and Mitchell (n 7) 18 (of the preview 
available online). Similarly, Regan, The Meaning (n 7) 363: ‘the Appellate Body has yet to say that any specific 
legitimate regulatory purpose is less valuable than any other.’ For some examples, see for instance the Report 
of the Panel in US – Gambling (n 51) [6.492], acknowledging that the interests and values protected by the 
challenged measures serve very important societal interests that can be characterized as ‘vital and important 
in the highest degree’ (see also [6.558]). Likewise, see Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, Report of the Panel (n 
54) [7.215]: ‘The Panel finds no reason to question the Dominican Republic's assertions in the sense that the 
collection of tax revenue … is a most important interest for any country and particularly for a developing 
country such as the Dominican Republic.’ See also WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres—Report of the Panel (12 June 2007) WT/DS332/R [7.112]. Even with respect to China’s mundane 
attempt to invoke art XX(d) in WTO, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts—Reports of the 
Panel (18 July 2008) WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R [7.360] the Panel could not help 
acknowledging the importance of the proclaimed interest (tax collection). See also WTO, United States – 
Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand—Report of the Appellate Body (16 July 2008) WT/DS343/AB/R and 
WT/DS345/AB/R [313], and Colombia – Entry Ports, Report of the Panel (n 32) [7.566] (fighting under-
invoicing and money laundering). In this respect, see also McGrady (n 36) 162. 
58 See Regan, The Meaning (n 7) 357: ‘the only consideration in the Appellate Body’s list that is relevant to a 
cost–benefit balancing test and not to a less-restrictive alternative test is the value of the regulatory purpose, 
which as we have already seen is a seriously suspect consideration’. 
59 This cost-benefit analysis, in fact, was merely proclaimed in Korea – Beef and never applied, see Joel P 
Trachtman, ‘Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO’ (2007) 10 JIEL 631, 647. For an enlightening analysis of 
the necessity test under cost-benefit terms that takes into account the Learned Hand test and other similar 
formulas, see David Collins, ‘Health Protection at the World Trade Organization - The J-Value as a Universal 
Standard for Reasonableness of Regulatory Precautions’ (2009) 43 JWT 1071. 
60 Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, Report of the Panel (n 54) [7.215], quoted also in Kapterian (n 7) 122. 
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LTRM test is apt to ascertain the necessity of a measure, the WAB serving merely as a 
warm-up test. 
 
It is just argued, here, that the ‘balancing’ result is rarely spelled out in clear terms, and 
virtually never relied upon to decide on the WTO-legality of the measure.61 Take for 
instance the Colombia – Entry Ports case. Formally, the Panel held that since one of the three 
factors of the ‘balancing’ was irremediably flawed (the measure made an insignificant 
contribution to the policy objective), the art XX(d) GATT defence did not stand.62 
Although seemingly the case was decided on the WAB, this outcome could have been the 
result of the least-restrictive test as well: given the low level of effectiveness, many better 
alternatives were available to the defendant (like in Korea – Beef). At most, the WAB is a 
simpler version of the LTRM, filtering out measures that are prima facie untenable.63 
 
This might sound fair: after all, it was not clear in the first place how the Panels and the AB 
could be entitled to perform any sort of balancing between values, given the presumption 
for regulatory autonomy that reigns in the WTO. Balancing and proportionality are a 
prerogative of constitutional adjudication,64 and are at variance with the negative 
integration paradigm described above.65 However, as Sykes first showed in 2003, there is 
some discernible pattern in the practice of Panels and AB, whereby certain Values are 
treated more deferentially than others (in particular, the protection of human health66). The 
following section intends to account for this trend in the case-law, and explain how it 
pervades the application of the LTRM test (whereas the WAB slowly turned into what it 
actually is, i.e. little more than a boilerplate section of the reasoning), and in particular the 
search for ‘reasonably available alternative measures.’ 
 
One clear example of this trend is that Panels and AB, from time to time, do not shy away 
from taking an exploratory detour to look into the consistency of the respondent party’s 
policies, with respect to the chosen level of protection for values other than the Value.67 This 
                                                 
61 Note, for instance, how the utmost importance of the public interest is a variable that did not affect the 
result in the Cigarettes case, or how the ruinous effect on trade of the remote-gambling ban was not, per se, 
sufficient to prevent the AB from finding it ‘necessary,’ and pass on to the chapeau test, in Gambling. 
62 Colombia – Entry Ports, Report of the Panel (n 32) [7.619]. 
63 This use of WAB is consistent with the evidentiary regime: it is for the responding party to propose a prima 
facie case of necessity, and this is where the WAB should operate, see Christopher Doyle, ‘Gimme Shelter: the 
‘Necessary’ Element of GATT Article XX in the Context of the China-Audiovisual Products Case’ (2011) 29 
Boston U Intl L J 143, 159. 
64 On this, see extensively Stone Sweet and Mathews (n 7) 138 and passim. 
65 On the WTO incompetence to rule on similar conflict of values, see Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Law of 
Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’ (2002) 27 YJIL 59, 101. 
66 See Petros C Mavroidis, George A Bermann and Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO): Documents, Cases and Analysis (West Group 2010) 693. 
67 In the Asbestos case (no 44) the AB had refused to take into account the fact that the EC enforced less rigid 
measures with respect to other dangerous substances; in Korea – Beef (no 6) it looked at the less restrictive 
policies adopted by Korea in other sectors in the market, but allegedly only for the purpose of finding 
reasonable alternatives to the dual-retail system. In the Gambling case, instead, the Panel went further and 
seemed to review the US conduct in a parallel sector of the services market (namely, non-remote gambling 
services) in order to question the overly high level of protection of public morals pursued, see US – Gambling, 
Report of the Panel (n 51) [6.493]: ‘[we ought to] determine whether particular aspects associated with the 
remote supply of gambling and betting services will justify a prohibition, particularly in light of the tolerant 
attitude displayed in some parts of the United States to the non-remote supply of such services.’ The Panel 
determined that on-line gambling entails some specific risks that could require a different regulation from the 
one governing non-remote gambling services (see [6.521]). Finally, in China – Raw Materials (see below) the 
Panel noticed that China’s invocation of health policy objectives attached only to some of its export duties. 
The Panel inferred from the China’s failure to invoke art XX(b) GATT with respect to other equivalent 
measures an adverse inference as to the genuineness of its defense, see [7.496] ff. 
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is expressly provided for in art 5.5 SPS, for the purpose of encouraging States to adopt 
sanitary and phytosanitary policies that are at least roughly homogeneous.68 On the 
contrary, nothing in the GATT or in the basic formulation of the LTRM test suggests that 
a measure is per se less necessary if the State has set a lower level of protection for other 
Values, or if it seems fit to implement them using less-restrictive measures. 
 
8. THE WILDCARDS: COMPLEMENTARITY AND QUANTITATIVE 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
In the Brazil – Tyres dispute, Brazil’s ban of foreign re-treaded tyres (other than those from 
MERCOSUR countries) was purportedly aimed at securing a better level of health 
protection.69 The AB hung to the WAB test, describing it as ‘a holistic operation that 
involves putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating them in relation to 
each other after having examined them individually, in order to reach an overall 
judgement.’
70 In truth, the Panel diligently considered and weighed the three WAB factors: 
human life and health are very important (good), the ban is extremely trade-restrictive 
(bad), but likely to make a certain contribution towards the overall policy of disposed tyres 
reduction (average). 
 
As mentioned above, there is a difference in the Value (health) and the purpose that the 
measure is supposed to achieve (reduction of disposed tyres). Arguably,71 Brazil’s insistence 
on the latter was a smart move in the LTRM perspective: interlacing health and tyre-waste 
reduction within one policy objective left the Panel and the claiming party with a truncated 
LTRM review to perform. If Brazil had declared that health protection was the Value, it 
would have been easier for the Panel to point at alternative less-restrictive measures that 
could ensure a similar or better result, and had nothing to do with disposed tyres. By 
focusing on tyre-disposal as the ultimate objective, instead, Brazil managed to limit the 
Panel’s review to the tyre-reduction effect of the measure, drastically narrowing down the 
Panel’s margin of discretion in looking for alternative measures. 
 
The AB also confirmed the Panel’s loose evaluation of the third factor, that is, the 
assessment of the contribution made by the measure in ‘qualitative’ (lege: rough) terms, 
rather than on the basis of quantitative measurable data.72 This quantitative appraisal is 
especially likely to be justified when the contribution is not observable immediately or in 
the short term, or when it forms part of an aggregate contribution made by several 
cumulative measures.73 
                                                 
68 On the obligation under art 5.5 SPS, and in particular on how this provision compares to the obligation 
under art XX GATT, see Michael Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the 
WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?’ (2010) 13 JIEL 1077, 1083 ff. 
69 At [4.11] of the Report of the Panel (n 57), Brazil mentions, inter alia, the risks related to cancer, dengue 
(and other mosquito-borne diseases), reproductive problems and environmental contamination that would be 
aggravated by permitting that non-reusable tyres are disposed and amassed in large landfills that might 
harbor mosquito colonies. 
70 Brazil – Tyres, Report of the Appellate Body (n 5) [182]. 
71 This is also the central view in Bown and Trachmann (n 14). 
72 Brazil – Tyres, Report of the Appellate Body (n 5) [147]. See also [210]. Note how this assessment of the 
rough contribution of the measure is apparently at variance with the AB’s statement that a necessary measure 
is ‘located significantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making a 
contribution to,’ in Korea – Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 6) [161]. This method to assess the 
contribution of the measure, as Bown and Trachmann (n 14) rightly note, is similar to the ‘suitability test’ 
advocated in the 90’s by the US. However, this takes place within the virtually irrelevant WAB, so it does not 
substitute the LTRM. 
73 Brazil – Tyres, Report of the Appellate Body (n 5) [151]. 
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When the Panel performed the LTRM, it essentially discarded all alternative measures 
proposed by the EC, because they were either unfeasible or already in place, together with 
the challenged ones.74 It should be noted that in this case, since the assessment of the 
contribution was conducted without looking at its magnitude, or, as the AB put it more 
elegantly, ‘qualitatively,’ the LTRM was affected accordingly. As seen above, the WAB is a 
preparatory exercise, which does not substitute the LTRM test; but if the LTRM relies on 
the information collected in the WAB, any flaw in the latter would transmit to the former. 
 
In Brazil – Tyres, the ‘qualitative’ assessment of the contribution of the ban to the sought 
objective had a double consequence. It impaired the balancing phase (non-measurable 
entities can hardly be weighed against each other) and affected the LTRM test, because it is 
impossible to look for equally-effective alternatives when the effectiveness of the original 
measure is not known to begin with, at least in objective terms.75 
 
9. THE PRACTICE OF EXCEPTION-SHOPPING, AND THE REVIVAL OF THE 
WAB 
 
In this case,76 China invoked the art XX(a) GATT exception in order to justify several 
measures targeting the sale and distribution of imported audiovisual products. These 
measures were directly or indirectly aimed at ensuring that the Chinese authorities perform 
some control review over the imported material. The Panel accepted the subsumption under 
the art XX(a) GATT, and expressed its customary praise for the policy objective and the 
(legitimately) high level of protection sought.77 The claimant (the US) did not challenge this 
qualification, limiting itself to claim that the measures were not necessary. In so doing, it 
somehow conceded implicitly that Chinese censorship on foreign audiovisual materials was 
a perfectly legitimate policy (that only needed to be performed efficiently and non-
discriminatorily), and that its exported materials could actually harm Chinese public 
morality.78 
 
The Panel used the two-step analysis (WAB and LTRM), ‘concluding’ at first that the 
measures were necessary (under the WAB), then that they were not, because reasonable 
alternatives were available. In an attempt to clarify, the AB definitively certified the 
preparatory (‘intermediate’) role of the WAB: 
 
the Panel’s use of the word ‘conclude’ in setting out its intermediate findings risks misleading 
a reader, as does its characterization of certain requirements as ‘necessary’ before it had 
considered the availability of a less restrictive alternative measure.79 
 
                                                 
74 On this particular aspect, see McGrady (n 36) 155–60.  
75 See Bown and Trachtmann (n 14): ‘the Appellate Body’s approach also makes impossible the use of a 
LTIARA test, for such a test must determine equivalence of contribution, and equivalence of contribution 
requires assessment of magnitudes. So, in effect, the Appellate Body has now implicitly backed away not only 
from balancing, but also from the traditional LTIARA test’. 
76 WTO, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distributional Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Products—Report of the Appellate Body (21 December 2009) WT/DS363/AB/R. A thorough 
comment is provided in Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Squaring Free Trade in Culture with Chinese Censorship: The WTO 
Appellate Body Report on China – Audiovisuals’ (2010) 11 Melbourne J Intl L 119. 
77 WTO, China – Audiovisuals—Report of the Panel (12 August 2009) WT/DS363/R [7.817-818]. 
78 On the unfortunate implications of this strategy, that seemed hinge upon the care with which all parties 
involved tried to avoid a head-on clash on the Chinese censorship regime, see Pauwelyn (n 76) 132–135. 
79 China – Audiovisuals, Report of the Appellate Body (n 76), [248] (emphasis added). 
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The AB also fine-tuned the Brazil – Tyres’ opening to the ‘qualitative’ assessment of a 
measure’s contribution, maybe realizing that a loose evaluation of this factor would falsify 
both the WAB and the LTRM tests. It recalled that the contribution is to be assessed 
primarily with the support of evidence and factual information, and only residually is a 
qualitative assessment possible.80 Moreover, it criticized the analysis of the Panel, for 
relying too much on assumptions and failing to do as promised, ie assessing the ‘actual 
contribution’ of the Chinese measures to the protection of public morals.81 
 
Whereas the Panel seemingly engaged in an accurate WAB test82 and used the results 
thereof to pronounce on the necessity of the measures, the AB reversed the analysis, and 
held that China failed to prove that any of the measures was apt to make an actual 
contribution. However, this did not lead the AB’s report to a sudden conclusion (as one 
might expect: if a measure makes no contribution to the stated policy, it certainly fails under 
the WAB test, but it also renders the LTRM test moot). Instead, the AB entered the LTRM 
anyway, and confirmed the Panel’s assessment (other measures were reasonably available83). 
However, the premise on the contribution was so different that it is hard to understand 
what the AB meant when it said that ‘United States has demonstrated that the proposed 
alternative would … make a contribution that is at least equivalent to the contribution made 
by the measures at issue to securing China’s desired level of protection of public moral.’84 It 
seems that the AB, like in the Dominican Republic – Cigarettes precedent, summoned an 
eighth member, Monsieur Jacques de la Palice, the only one who could subscribe without 
embarrassment that the measure made no contribution, and that accordingly any of the 
alternative proposals was (of course) as effective, or even more.85 
 
10. MAKING SENSE OF THE TYRES GUIDELINES ON CONTRIBUTION 
 
                                                 
80 ibid [253]. 
81 ibid [294]: ‘In reaching its finding regarding the contribution made by the State plan requirement to the 
protection of public morals in China, the Panel simply stated that limiting the number of import entities ‘can 
make a material contribution’ to the protection of public morals in China. Yet, the Panel neither addressed 
quantitative projections nor provided qualitative reasoning based on evidence before it to support that 
finding.’ 
82 China – Audiovisuals, Report of the Panel (n 77) [7.828], [7.836], [7.863], [7.868]. For the Panel those 
measures imposing requisites for national importing enterprises were likely to be effective, and they did not 
restrict imports a priori, therefore they were legitimate. Other measures, to the contrary, were found not to be 
reasonably contributing to the attainment of the overall policy, and raised protectionism concerns, therefore 
they were reviewed more strictly. However, in light of their low trade-restrictiveness (and of the importance 
of the value pursued) some of them passed the necessity test, whereas others affecting the importing rate more 
significantly (or qualitatively, setting a priori prohibitions) were rejected by the Panel. See Fontanelli, Whose 
Margin (n 7), 399, noting that this was the as close to a real balancing as one could hope to find in the WTO 
case-law. 
83 China – Audiovisuals, Report of the Panel (n 77) [7.898]: ‘It emerges … that implementing the US proposal 
would make a contribution that is at least equivalent to that of the relevant [China measures]. At the same 
time, the US proposal would have a significantly less restrictive impact on importers – in fact, it would have 
no such impact – without there being any indication that it would necessarily have a more restrictive impact 
on imports of relevant products than the [measures] at issue’. 
84 China – Audiovisuals, Report of the Appellate Body (n 76) [335]. 
85 Note that the AB expressly insists that the LTRM is the dynamic combination of the values collected during 
the static WAB analysis, making it all the more weird, if one thinks that the AB itself had denied that the 
measures could made any contribution. See ibid., [310]: ‘if a Member chooses to adopt a very restrictive 
measure, it will have to ensure that the measure is carefully designed so that the other elements to be taken 
into account in weighing and balancing the factors relevant to an assessment of the ‘necessity’ of the measure 
will ‘outweigh’ such restrictive effect’. 
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In the China – Raw Materials dispute,86 several complaining parties challenged Chinese 
measures setting export restrictions on certain raw materials. China invoked, among other 
things, art XX(b) and (g) GATT (on the preservation of exhaustible resources87), with 
arguments displaying various levels of conviction and convincingness. The Panel found that 
these measures were adopted in violation of the China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO,88 
and therefore the general exceptions of art XX GATT could not apply, since there was no 
reference to the GATT discipline in the applicable WTO instrument.89 The AB later 
confirmed this view.90 
 
However, the Panel performed the review of the measures at issue under art XX GATT, to 
ensure the completeness of its Report had the AB chosen to reverse the finding on the 
application of this provision. Leaving the art XX(g) GATT-defence aside,91 we should focus 
on the Panel’s reasoning on the health-related argument (which is similar to Brazil’s one in 
Tyres: in essence, limiting exports of both scrap and raw materials, China would favour the 
transition of its industrial economy to a ‘recycle’ or ‘circular’ model, causing the increase of 
health protection standards that follows naturally from the adoption of an environmentally 
sustainable model).92 
 
The claimants contended that the health-friendly description of the export duties was a 
mere ex post facto rationalization of measures that were not originally designed to protect 
health. The Panel upheld this complaint,93 but decided to assess whether the measures could 
nevertheless make some material (although unintended) contribution to that end. The Panel 
concluded that the evidence submitted did not evince that the export restrictions made a 
material contribution to the protection of health (for one thing, because China, while 
highlighting the beneficial effects of said policies, omitted to account for their health-
adverse effects).94 Moreover the Panel, mindful of the Brazil – Tyres dictum about the 
‘aptness’ of the measure to make some ‘future contribution’ to the policy objective, 
determined that it was not enough for China to simply claim that these measures could 
increase national growth and welfare, and consequently raise the level of health 
protection.95 After declaring China’s failure to demonstrate that the measures fell under art 
XX(b) GATT, like in the EC – Tariff Preferences case, the Panel went on arguendo, to prove 
that in any event the measures could not pass the LTRM test. 
 
11. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
86 WTO, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials—Report of the Panel (5 July 2011) 
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R. The AB Report was published on 30 January 2012. 
87 China – Raw Materials, Report of the Panel (n 86) [7.356]: ‘China’s argument is that refractory-grade 
bauxite and fluorspar are exhaustible natural resources; they are scarce, are not easily substitutable, and thus 
need to be managed and protected’. 
88 See art 11, paragraph 3. 
89 China – Raw Materials, Report of the Panel (n 86), section VII.B.5. 
90 China – Raw Materials, Report of the Appellate Body (n 86) [307]. 
91 Primarily, because the standard required is not one of necessity, but of ‘relation to’ the policy objective. 
Moreover, the defense failed because China did not prove to be in compliance with the even-handedness 
condition of art XX(g) GATT, whereby measures restricting exports must be made effective ‘in conjunction’ 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 
92 China – Raw Materials, Report of the Panel (n 86) [7.471-472]. 
93 ibid [7.516]. 
94 ibid [7.538], [7.604]. 
95 ibid [7.553]: ‘For the Panel, even if growth makes environmental protection statistically more likely, this 
does not prove that export restrictions are necessary for environmental gains. For example, to the extent that 
a higher income per capita generates citizens’ preferences for a better quality of environment, income 
redistribution policies may serve the environmental objective just as well as it is claimed that export 
restrictions do’. 
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The first claim of this article is that, as it emerged repeatedly in the case-law, the balancing 
test filters measures that would have failed the least-restrictive analysis upfront, for being 
both ineffective and significantly restrictive. No actual balancing is ever performed through 
the ‘weighing.’ The WAB is similar to the weighing-in session in boxing: fighters are 
weighed, but the real confrontation occurs later,96 and somewhere else (in the LTRM ring, 
as it were). 
 
The second claim is, however, that some proportionality might be spotted here and there, in 
the use of the LTRM routine, under the radar of the reports’ reasoning. A list of these 
instances, without pretence to exhaustiveness, is below: 
 
- As mentioned above,97 sometimes the Panel takes the liberty to look into other 
policy areas regulated by the State, so as to get a sense of what could be an 
appropriate level of protection for similar Values, and whether the measure under 
analysis is so unusually restrictive that it might harbour a protectionist design. 
Obviously, when the measure is designed to achieve a relatively ‘less vital’ Value, it 
will be easier to find out that the State has in place less rigid policies regarding 
equivalent values. 
- When the Value is human health, the ‘zero risk’ (or ‘maximum possible 
enhancement’) level of protection can be accepted (see Asbestos, Brazil – Tyres), 
whereas in connection with other Values it is routinely toned down by the AB (see 
Korea – Beef, Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, Apples I and Apples II).98 More generally, 
it is not unheard of that adjudicators, when ascertaining whether the less-restrictive 
alternative can meet the level of protection of the original measure,99 lower the 
‘appropriate level of protection’ predetermined by the State, so as to make the 
alternative eligible.100 
- When the Value is health protection, at least in one case it was acceptable to 
evaluate the contribution of the measure ‘qualitatively,’ prospectively, and 
cumulatively with other policy measures (Brazil – Tyres). This opening was 
unprecedented, and was somehow shut down when, dealing with the policy objective 
of public morals, the AB required again that the measure be evaluated relying on 
objective evidence of the actual contribution (China – Audiovisuals).101 
                                                 
96 This brings to mind Bown and Trachtman’s lament (n 14) 88: ‘Yet, one might ask, if you consider these 
factors, but you do not compare them with each other … how do you determine which domestic measures are 
acceptable and which are not?’. 
97 See above, particularly notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
98 WTO, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples—Report of the Appellate Body (10 December 2003) 
WT/DS245/AB/R, and WTO, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand—
Report of the Appellate Body (29 November 2010) WT/DS367/AB/R. The Apples cases are not discussed in this 
article, as the necessity test applied therein is derived from art 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, rather than art XX 
GATT. A brief discussion of both disputes is provided in Filippo Fontanelli, ‘When SPS applies to apples. The 
Japan – Apples and Australia – Apples WTO disputes’ in Sabino Cassese et al. (eds), Global Administrative Law: 
Cases, Materials, Issues, third edition, (IRPA-IIJL 2012), Vol. IV, 23-29 <http://www.irpa.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/The-Casebook-Chapter-4.pdf>. 
99 On the difficulty of this exercise, see WTO, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse to 
Article 21.5 by Canada—Report of the Panel (18 February 2000) WT/DS18/RW [7.128–7.131] (in which the 
LTRM was governed by art 5.6 SPS). 
100 On this, see Ming Du (n 68) especially 1097 ff. 
101 In my view, the China – Raw Materials Panel Report does not disprove this distinction, at least because 
China’s demonstration about the contribution to health are prima facie untenable. The main problem of China’s 
measures, with respect to the art XX(b) GATT justification, is that apparently they were not designed to 
pursue higher levels of health protection: they would have failed even at the rational analysis soft test 
advocated in the 90’s by the US. 
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- Likewise, the qualitative approach of Tyres fits into the habit of relaxing the scientific 
boundaries of the assessment of health-related protection. In a similar vein, see how 
the AB held in EC – Hormones and Asbestos that governments are not obliged to base 
their health policies on the mainstream scientific opinion, as long as the minority 
views that they espouse come from ‘qualified and respected sources’.102 
 
Although these trends are hardly disputable, especially in their cumulative effect, their 
existence does not add to the predictability of the necessity test. They are not amenable to 
the text of art XX GATT, nor are they clearly derived from the reasoning of Panels and AB 
on the correct way to interpret and apply this provision. In other words, these trends are 
under the radar, and so are the reasons and the conditions of their operation, the ‘necessity’ 
standard of review ‘enables the AB to keep maximum adjudicatory flexibility; but it leaves 
Members uncertain of the legality of their measures’103 or, to put it more graphically, leaves 
Members and (judicious) judges ‘wandering in deserts of uncharted discretion.’104 
 
Weiler pointed out that the AB in Korea – Beef blurted out its genuine take on the WAB (a 
real proportionality test), only to reassume a moderate (but impenetrable) attitude, later in 
the same Korea report and in following ones.105 This assumption of discretion, given the 
AB’s mandate to ‘complete’ the WTO contract, is not pernicious per se. After all, it is a 
matter of jurisdictional allocation, and it might be acceptable that States devolve to the 
WTO (and to its judiciary) the competence to bring down not only discriminatory 
measures, but also inefficient measures, as it is normally the case under the TBT and SPS.106 
One can easily draw a comparison between the Apples cases and some of the art XX GATT 
cases described above. Japan and Australia’s measures to prevent the slightest risk of plant 
disease were not discriminatory, but were disproportionate in light of the remoteness of the 
risk. Likewise, think of Korea’s concern for commercial fraud in the meat sector, Dominican 
Republic’s apprehension about illegal border transactions, China’s alleged interest in 
monitoring cultural material that could threat its cultural identity: the implementation of 
these Values did not necessarily result in discriminatory measures, but their impact on trade 
was disproportionate, and WTO DSM bodies used an augmented LTRM test to strike them 
off. 
 
                                                 
102 WTO, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products – Report of the Appellate Body (16 January 1998) 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R [194]. EC – Asbestos, Report of the Appellate Body (n 44) [178]. See 
Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 66) 699-700. 
103 See Ming Du (n 68) 1096. In Bown and Trachtman’s words: ‘The result … is so incoherent as to leave 
states unsure as to what types of measures may withstand scrutiny’ (n 14) 88. Similarly, Kapterian (n 7) 118. 
104 ExxonShippingCo. v. Baker, 2008, 128 S.Ct.2605, citing Frankel (1973) ‘Criminal Sentences: Law without 
order.’ This quote is used in Fontanelli, Whose Margin (n 7), to exemplify the main claim of that work, that 
the margin of action that Members should be afforded has turned into a margin of adjudication in the hands of 
the judges, through the misuse of the necessity test. 
105 Weiler (n 43) 144. According to Ming Du (n 68) 1101: ‘The AB’s approach is pragmatic in the sense that it 
both retains de jure regulatory autonomy, but de facto allows balancing scrutiny to root out indefensible, 
haphazardly set risk levels’. 
106 See Trachtman (n 59) 647: ‘The WTO’s negative integration 'trade-off devices,' including national 
treatment, least-trade restrictive alternative testing and balancing testing, may be understood simply as 
mandates to judges to exercise discretion in the allocation of jurisdictional authority. […] they leave much 
discretion to judges, they may plausibly be understood to orient and constrain judges towards, if not to, an 
approximation of efficiency. They do so under circumstances where it is difficult to imagine an alternative 
approach, other than one of positive integration. Positive integration has its own costs.’ For an earlier 
formulation and a wider discussion of this view, see Id., ‘Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Subsidiarity’ (1998) 9 EJIL 32, 82 and Id., ‘Institutional Linkage: Transcending ‘Trade and …’ – an 
Institutional Perspective’ (2002) 96 AJIL 77. 
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The LTRM test, being narrowly devoted to ensure Pareto optimization,107 fails to represent 
an open and flexible test for the evaluation of policies, therefore it is understandable that 
some deal of reasonableness and good governance108 finds its way in the reasoning of the 
Panels and AB. 
 
However, the haphazard accumulation of redundant and wearisome tests related to the 
necessity requirement of art XX(a) (b) and (d) GATT does not seem the optimal way to 
ensure that a bit of reasonableness underpins the Reports of the Dispute Settlement Body. 
As things stand now, Panels and AB are more likely to appear activist rather than 
reasonable when they soften the LTRM test: maybe it is time to dust the WAB and start 
embracing, very cautiously, a bit of proportionality proprement dite. 
 
In sum, it is fair to note that the mandate of WTO quasi-judicial bodies is such that no real 
proportionality can control the outcome of a case. 109 This is visible in the truncated WAB 
(where the first factor is never really weighed), and in the obstinate use of the LTRM. 
There is some subterranean ‘constitutional’ trend, traceable in a ‘loose’ use of the LTRM 
and the statistical evidence showing that certain values and ‘more Values’ than the others.  
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
107 According to Trachtman, Trade and… (n 106) 72, it can be overbroad and under-inclusive at the same 
time: ‘[n]ecessity testing engages in truncated maximization, or truncated comparative cost-benefit analysis, 
by keeping the regulatory benefit relatively constant and working on the trade detriment side. It thus 
evaluates a much more limited range of options, ignoring other groups of options that may be superior’. 
108 Lang (n 42) 325. 
109 Nor could the AB perform this constitutional test. See Lang (n 42) 320 ff; P. Van den Bossche (n 42) 283; 
Jan Neumann and Elisabeth Türk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law 
after Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines’ (2003) 37 JWT 199, 214, 233, and bibliography referred 
to therein. For a definition of the narrow proportionality test, see Trachtman, Trade and… (n 106) 35, and 
bibliography referred to therein. 
